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INSURANCE COMPANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
MARKETING OF EQUITY PRODUCTS
PAUL R. HUARD*
INTRODUCTION
It is by now an accepted fact that life insurance companies—on a
rather large scale—have taken the "almighty leap" into the distribu-
tion of equity-based products.' Initially, perhaps, the movement was
reluctant; traditionally, career life insurance agents had been instilled
with distinctly unkind attitudes regarding the wisdom of investing in
common stocks or other equity vehicles such as mutual funds. How-
ever, a glance at statistical data from the post-war decades shows that
insurers came to have good reason to reassess that position. During
the period from World War II to the late 1960's, the insurance indus-
try's share of the American savings dollar fell by about two-thirds,
even though assets held by insurers had increased substantially when
measured in absolute terms.' On the other hand, interest in equity
investments grew steadily; during roughly the same period, the
assets held by the mutual fund industry increased more than a hun-
dred-fold, and the number of mutual fund shareholders increased more
than fifteen times.' A marked change in consumer preferences was
underway, apparently motivated by a desire for protection against
inflationary increases in the cost of living.
The current movement into equity distribution represents the life
insurance industry's response to this change. Insurers have discovered
that offering only their traditional products, which provide solely for
fixed-dollar returns, places them at a disadvantage in competing for
the consumer's investment dollar. Moreover, state insurance laws re-
quire that the assets held by insurers to back such traditional prod-
ucts be invested in nonequity securities :1 Accordingly, many insurers
'I' A.B., Boston College, 1966; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1969; Mem-
ber of the District of Columbia Bar; Trial Attorney (Finance), Securities and Exchange
Commission, Division of Corporate Regulation, 1969-70; Counsel, American Life Conven-
tion, Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the American Life Convention or any of its member com-
panies.
1
 Sheehan, Life Insurance's Almighty Leap Into Equities, 78 Fortune 142 (Oct.,
1968).
2
 Routier, The Mutual Fund Approach to Equity Products, 1968 Proceeding of the
Legal Section, American Life Convention 13; Institutional Investor Study Report of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at
510 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study].
8
 The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732, 737
(1969).
4
 Sheehan, supra note 1, at 146.
1195
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
have concluded that they must offer equity-based products if they are
to get a bigger share of the public savings dollar." While such products
vary over a broad spectrum, and a few companies have dabbled with
some of the less common varieties such as real estate investment trusts
and interests in oil and gas drilling ventures,' insurers have concen-
trated primarily on mutual funds and variable annuities. A potential
third major product, variable life insurance, is currently being de-
veloped for sale.
This article examines the insurance industry's involvement with
these three equity products. The article will assess each product in
turn, describing its major features, outlining the applicable federal
regulatory scheme, and discussing insurers' present and prospective
activities with regard to sales of that product.
Finally, it will describe the position of the industry regarding
regulation of variable life insurance. Although at this time sales of this
product are only prospective, all segments of the industry are eagerly
awaiting the outcome of the current Securities and Exchange Com-




A mutual fund is technically defined as an open-end management
investment company? As such, it invests in corporate stocks and sells
to the public securities representing a pro rata share of its invest-
ments.' Typically, those investments are concentrated in a diversified
, 5
 See SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 2, at 508-11.
13
 Id. at 511.
7
 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines an investment company, for the
purposes of the Act, as any issuer which:
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and
has any such certificate outstanding; or
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items)
on an unconsolidated basis.
Id. 3(a), 15 U.S.C. I 80a-3(a) (1970).
8
 Approximately 93.0 percent of the total net assets of mutual funds consisted of
corporate securities, according to a study undertaken in 1958. Common stocks constituted
76% of net assets. Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds,
Prepared for the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 128 & 119 (1962).
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common stock portfolio. As an open-end investment company, the fund
is obligated to redeem the shares it issues upon demand,' in contrast
to a closed-end investment company which is under no such duty.'"
Thus an investor in a mutual fund obtains professional manage-
ment of a portfolio of investment securities in which he has a pro-
portionate interest. This management will have certain specific
objectives, such as preservation of capital, long-term growth, or produc-
tion of current income. Since objectives vary among different funds, an
investor may choose one with investment policies and goals suited to
his own particular purposes. The mutual fund shareholder also
obtains a diversification of his investment risk, for the assets of the
fund generally will be invested in as many as fifty or more different
issues of securities." Moreover, such diversification is available to the
investor at a much lower capital outlay than would be necessary if he
were to enter the stock market directly and attempt to spread his
purchases among an equivalent number of securities. It appears safe
to assume that such singular advantages will continue to attract in-
creasingly large numbers of investors.'2
9 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1970).
Before redeeming outstanding shares, the company must compute the net asset value
per share, calculated as follows. The total net asset value of the fund is determined on
the basis of the current market prices of the fund's holdings. This figure is then divided
by the total number of fund shares outstanding, yielding a per share redemption value.
Rule 22c-1, promulgated under the Investment Company Act, requires that the net
asset value of fund shares be computed not less often than daily or of the time trading
closes on the New York Stock Exchange. 17 C.F.R. 270.22c-1(b) (1971). Current net
asset value quotations for almost all funds of significant size appear in many daily news-
papers.
10 Section 5(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act defines closed-end companies
broadly as "any management company other than an open-end company." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-5(a)(2) (1970). Section 5(b) of this Act further classifies management companies
as diversified and nondiversified, according to diversification in asset holdings of the
company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1970).
11 Under the Investment Company Act, a diversified company must invest at least
75% of the value of its assets in cash, government securities, securities of other investment
companies or other securities "limited in respect of any one issuer to an amount not greater
in value than 5 per centum of the value of the total assets of such management company
and to not more than 10 per centum of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer."
Section 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1970).
12 A nationwide survey by National Analysts, Inc., conducted for the Investment
Company Institute, found that the most extensively appreciated advantage of mutual
funds was diversification. Other recognized advantages were the shareholder's obligation to
contribute regular payments, the superior performance of fund shares as compared to
bank savings, fund management investment skills, capital gains tax advantages, and the
protection offered against inflation. Wiesenberger Services, Inc., Mutual Affairs, vol. 11
no. 5 at 4 (May, 1971) thereinafter cited as Mutual Affairs]. See also A Study of Mutual
Funds, supra note 8 at 3-6. "[T]his diversification of risk and widespread acceptance of
the associated indirect investment in common stock tends to lower the cost of equity
capital and stimulate riskier undertakings, with a higher average rate of return than
would probably otherwise be realized for a given total investment." Id. at 3.
1197
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW .REVIEW
B. The Entry of Insurers into the Field of Mutual Funds:
General Regulatory Considerations
Regulation by the SEC necessarily accompanies entry into the
mutual fund field. Any mutual fund, once formed, must be registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 18 and its shares must be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933. 14 The entity which
manages the fund must register as an investment adviser under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 18
 The entity which will act as the
distributor for fund shares, usually a subsidiary established for this
purpose, must register as a broker-dealer pursuant to the requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 10
 Compliance with the 1934
Act also requires that sales personnel take qualifying examinations
and that the activities of such personnel be adequately supervised.'
18
 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970). The Investment Company Act imposes require-
ments regarding the composition of a fund's board of directors (§§ 9, 10, 16, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-9, 10, 16 (1970)), regulates purchases and sales between the fund and affiliated
persons (§ 17, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1970)), governs investment advisory and underwriting
contracts (§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970)) and prohibits the fund from making changes in
its basic policies or cl"ccifications without shareholder approval (§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I3
(1970)). Also, the 1940 Act imposes price maintenance rules on mutual fund shares to
prevent price discrimination against investors. Section 22, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1970). For
a detailed discussion of § 22(d) see Hodes, Recent Developments under Section 22(d) of
the Investment Company Act, at p. 1061 supra.
In addition, the 1940 Act requires filing of all sales literature used in conjunction
with the sale of fund shares with the SEC or the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). See notes 23-27 and accompanying text infra. A comprehensive discus-
sion of the regulatory considerations relevant to an insurance company's engagement in
mutual fund sales is contained in Kannel, Life Companies and the Mutual Fund Business:
The Out-Heroding of Herod, Paper Presented to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel
(Dec. 8, 1969), reprinted in 21 Association of Life Insurance Counsel Proceedings 165
(1969-1970).
14
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970). Section 5(a) of this Act makes it unlawful to use
the mails or any other facilities in interstate commerce to sell or transport any securities
covered by the Act which are not registered. 15 U.S.C. 77e(a) (1970). Section 7 of the
1933 Act outlines the information required in a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77g
(1970). However, Section 24(a) of the Investment Company Act provides for filing a
registration statement pursuant to the 1940 Act in lieu of filing the statement outlined in
Section 7 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(a) (1970).
In addition to the initial registration of the fund's shares, the 1933 Act further requires
that a prospectus precede or accompany all sales of registered shares, informing investors
of all facts relevant to the security and its issuer. Section 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970).
The prospectus must conform to the requirements of Section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970).
See generally 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulations chs. 2, 3. (2d ed. 1961).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b et seq. (1970). This requirement is a relatively recent develop-
ment resulting from the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970. Prior to Decem-
ber 14, 1971, advisers whose sole clients were investment companies were exempt from
registration under § 203(b) (2) of the Adviser's Act. 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b) (2) (1970),
as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24(a), 84 Stat. 1413.
15
 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. (1970). Registration requirements for broker-dealers is set
out in § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970). The 1934 Act also seeks to guarantee that dealers are
financially responsible by mandating the maintenance of minimum capital requirements.
Section 15(b), 15 U.S.C. 780(b) (1970).
17
 Section 15(b) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (1970).
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The most important effect of registration under the 1934 Act is
the subjection of the registrant company, the broker-dealer, as well as
its individual sales personnel, to the Act's multifold antifraud provi-
sions," The broker is subject to civil and criminal liability, and viola-
tions of the Act's provisions may result in temporary or permanent
revocation of a dealer's registration? Finally, as a practical matter, the
distributing entity will usually become a member of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), and will be subject
to that organization's rules regarding sales practices and qualification
of personnel. 2°
The fund must also comply with the requirements of state se-
curities laws,2' which are usually limited to registration of the fund
shares and of the distributing broker-dealer. State requirements may
vary a great deal, however; 1933 Act registration is sufficient to qualify
fund shares in some states, while in others a complete and detailed
separate state registration is mandated. For the most part, insurance
companies have not found the problem arising from involvement in
mutual funds sales more difficult than those encountered by the rest
of the futual fund industry.' The particular difficulties that they do
encounter lie primarily in the areas of sales practices and joint trans-
See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, CCH, NASD Manual 1 2001 (1971). See also
Middlebrook and Gingold, Mass Merchandising of Equity Products by Insurance Com-
panies, 3 Conn. L. Rev. 44 (1970).
18 Sections 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 20, 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78g, i, j, n, p, r, t, cc (1970).
10 Section 15(b) (7) ; 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(1) (1970).
20 It is possible under Section 15(b) (8) of the Exchange Act for a broker-dealer to
elect direct regulation by the SEC or the NASD. 15 U.S.C. 4 780(b) (8). However, in the
case of a broker-dealer who wishes to sell established mutual funds, this is an illusory
choice. Section 25 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice prevents NASD members from
dealing with nonmembers other than on the same basis as the general public, and most
mutual fund principal underwriters are NASD members. CCH, NASD Manual (1971).
As such they are prohibited from extending dealer concessions or discounts to nonmembers
who may want to sell the funds they distribute, so that the maximum potential profit to
the nonmember and its salesmen on such a transaction is exactly zero. This rule has been
challenged by an insurance company and two of its subsidiaries which are non-NASD
broker-dealers and the hearing examiner has held in his initial decision that Rule 25 should
be abrogated in part. All parties, including the NASD, have appealed the decision and
the matter is now pending final resolution by the Commission itself. SEC Administrative
Proceeding File No. 3-2428.
21
 Section 18 of the 1933 Act preserves the rights of states to regulate securities
despite the federal right to regulate. 15 U.S.C. 77r (1970).
For detailed analyses of the problems in the area of state securities laws, see Ostlund,
State Blue Sky Laws: Problems for Variable Annuity Companies; Problems for Mutual
Fund Companies—Correlated Sales Problems, 1968 Proceedings of the Legal Section,
American Life Convention 230; Googins, Blue Sky Laws—Some Lingering Clouds, 3
Conn. L. Rev. 1 (1970) ; and Wilson, State Regulation of a Broker-Dealer Selling Variable
Annuities or Mutual Funds, 1970 Proceedings of the Legal Section, American Life Con-
vention 43.
22 See generally Kennel, supra note 13.
1199
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
actions between the insurance company's mutual fund subsidiary and
the insurer's general investment account.
Selling mutual fund shares offers a new challenge to insurers in
that the disclosure requirements and advertising limitations of the se-
curities laws apparently require the insurance companies to abandon
the marketing' and advertising techniques usually employed to sell
traditional insurance products. For example, all offers for the sale of
mutual fund shares must be accompanied by a prospectus" as defined
in Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933.' 4 The prospectus, a dis-
closure document rather than a sales document, is strictly limited in
content and scope. Advertisements that comply with Rule 134 of the
1933 Act are permitted, but the information which may be listed in
the so-called tombstone advertisement is so precisely curtailed that
its usefulness is doubtful. 25
All other sales literature issued in connection with the sale of
mutual fund shares must be filed with the SEC as well as the NASD,
and must comply with the Statement of Policy (SOP), a strict set of
guidelines governing advertising promulgated by the SEC." Although
this requirement is common to the entire mutual fund industry, in-
surance companies have found it difficult to adapt their advertising
practices to the rather inflexible requirements of the SOP, because
they are accustomed to use liberal promotional practices when selling
their traditional insurance products. Data commonly used to promote
the sale of life insurance, such as performance projections and product
comparisons, are strictly prohibited in mutual fund sales literature?'
Moreover, an insurance company's burden of compliance with these
strict standards may be heavier than that borne by other entities in the
fund industry, because the insurer must supervise a large number of
sales agents. Representatives of the insurance industry met recently
with the SEC staff to discuss possible changes in advertising standards,
and the Commission is now considering amendments to SEC rules
25 Section 5(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970).
24 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970).
25
 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1971). A proposed Amendment to this rule is under current
consideration. See Romanski, The Role of Advertising in the Mutual Funds Industry, at
p. 959 supra, for a detailed discussion of mutual fund advertising and an analysis of
current developments in the area.
25
 Securities Act Release No. 3856, 22 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Nov. 5, 1957), amending Re-
lease No. 3530; 20 Fed. Reg. 791 (Jan. 31, 1955). The SOP covers virtually all literature
relating to mutual funds, including reports to shareholders. Its restrictions are so
specifically detailed that, as one writer has observed, "it has forced all mutual fund
advertising into a narrow, stereotyped and unexciting pattern, which was undoubtedly the
purpose of the entire exercise." Kannel, supra note 13, at 230.
27
 Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1971). Securities Act Release No. 4709 (July 14,
1964) 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 1461 (1971). See also Romanski, The Role of Advertising
in the Mutual Funds Industry, pp. 959-63 supra.
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governing advertising of mutual funds.' The industry is hopeful that
revisions it considers necessary will be forthcoming.
Insurance companies have for some time questioned the pro-
visions of Section 17 of the Investment Company Act as applied to
transactions involving both an insurance company's general invest-
ment account and its affiliated mutual fund." Section 17, an attempt
to enjoin self-dealing, proscribes certain joint transactions between an
investment company and its affiliates." The Commission's interpreta-
tion of the section was promulgated in Rule 17d-1, and is widely
regarded in the industry as further obscuring rather than clarifying
the many questions that arise concerning the nature of the joint
participations proscribed. Such questions cause widespread concern,
since the insurance company risks violating Rule 17d-1 in any num-
ber of transactions involving stockholdings common to its general
investment and mutual fund accounts•" The insurance industry is
presently seeking an amendment to, or revision of, Rule 17d-1 which
would remove its ambiguities and eliminate the current requirement
that an individual ruling be obtained for every exemption to the rule's
prohibition of joint transactions.'.
C. The Entry of insurers into the Field of Mutual Funds:
Specific Methods and Regulatory Considerations
1. The Company-Organized Mutual Fund Complex
The formation of a self-organized mutual fund is the most
straightforward method of entering the mutual fund business. It is by
no means the easiest. Utilization of this approach creates federal and
state regulatory problems that do not arise if the insurance company
purchases, or enters into a selling agreement with, an existing fund."
Moreover, a company choosing this route faces particular corporate
legal problems and nonlegal administrative difficulties." Specific
regulatory problems presented in the creation of a mutual fund com-
plex include initial federal and state registration of a fund's securities,
28 Routier, Federal Securities Regulation 1971 at 57, Paper Presented Before the
American Life Convention (Oct. 26, '1971), to be reprinted in 1971 Proceedings of the
American Life Convention, Legal Section [hereinafter cited as Routier; citations are to
manuscript pages].
29 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1970).
8° 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1970); 17 C.F.R. §.270.17d-1 (1971).
31 Rule 17d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1971).
82 Investment Company Act Release No. 7035 (March 9, 1972).
33 See Thornsjo, Legal Problems and Processes in the Formation of a "Mutual Fund,"
1967 Proceedings of the Legal Section, American Life Convention 61; Kannel, supra note
13, at 202-14.
34 See sources cited in note 33 supra.
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a costly and lengthy process." In addition, the fund is, of course, sub-
ject to the general regulations of the Investment Company Act," the
Securities Exchange Ace' and the Investment Advisers Act. 88
Nonlegal problems encountered in the creation of a mutual fund
distinguish this method of entering the field from the alternative ap-
proaches available. Many practical business decisions must be made
regarding the type of fund desired, selection of its portfolio, the num-
ber and price of the shares to be offered, sales charges to be imposed,
and bookkeeping and auditing requirements. Distribution arrange-
ments must be made with an underwriter before shares can be offered
for sale. Also, acquisition of the necessary management skills may
prove difficult and in any case will require expensive contracts with
the management team chosen. It has been said that "the creation and
launching of a new Fund complex is a major undertaking which
obviously should not be taken on without a careful analysis of the
costs of the venture and the prospects for success.""
Despite these difficulties, most large insurance firms have pre-
ferred to build their own mutual fund complex." Self-organization of a
fund permits greater profits in the long run, allows the insurer to mold
the image and investment objectives of the fund, and guarantees iden-
tification of the insurance company with its fund. 41 Perhaps for these
reasons, the difficulties inherent in the creation of a mutual fund com-
plex do not appear to have deterred insurance companies from utilizing
this route. By the first quarter of 1971, more than sixty insurers bad
organized a total of eighty mutual funds with total net assets of $823
million.42
 Although this figure represents only 3.5 percent of the total
assets in insurance company owned or controlled mutual funds, the
number of funds involved is roughly equivalent to the eighty-six funds
purchased by insurers and considerably outnumbers the fifty-three
funds affiliated with insurers." Furthermore, the performance of
company-organized funds has outstripped that of the other types of
funds associated with insurers. Between the end of 1970 and March
1971, the aggregate assets of insurer-organized funds grew 16.9 per-
cent." Although this dramatic growth is due in part to their initially
85 See Schneider and Manko, Going Public—Practice, Procedure and Consequences,
15 VIII. L. Rev. 283, 298 (1970).
80 See note 13 supra.
87 See notes 16-19 and accompanying text, supra.
88 15 U.S.C. §1 80b et seq. (1970).
38 Kannel, supra note 13, at 197.
48 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 2, at 522.
41 Id. at 522-23.
42 Mutual Affairs, supra note 12, at 1. The relatively small overall size of these funds
can be attributed primarily to the fact that most have come into existence since 1968. Id.
43 Id. at 1-4.
44 Id. at I.
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low base point, "[n]evertheless, in the light of their newness, the
market atmosphere into which they were thrust and sales efforts
which at best could be generally considered to be more exploratory
than exceptional, the records of these funds need no apology.'
2. The Acquired Mutual Fund Complex
One of the quickest ways to get into the mutual fund business
with a minimum of preparatory work and delay is to acquire a con-
trolling interest in a fund management company and, in cases where
the distribution entity is separate from the management company, in
the underwriting organization as well. This approach eliminates initial
registration difficulties and other problems attached to the creation of
a new fund. Of course, if the company still desires to use its own sales
force to sell fund shares—as it frequently will—it remains necessary
to qualify the salesmen to sell securities." Creation and registration of
a broker-dealership may also be a necessity." In addition, the 1934
Act's antifraud strictures, of course, apply." These problems, how-
ever, are common to all methods of entry into the field.*
The difficulties peculiar to acquisition of a fund arise from the
fact that the SEC consistently maintains the position that investment
advisory contracts with a mutual fund are automatically terminated
upon the sale of a controlling interest in the management company."
As a result, approval of new advisory contracts by the shareholders
must be secured before the purchasing company can derive any benefit
from the controlling interest it has acquired. Proxy solicitation is
therefore required, and there always exists the possibility that the
shareholders will fail to approve. In practice, however, this simply has
not proven to be a problem."
A far more serious difficulty attendant upon the acquisition of
a fund has arisen from the recent decision of the Second Circuit in
Rosenfeld v. Black." In that case, the appellate court held that an
investment adviser to a registered investment company may be held
accountable, under common law equity principles of fiduciary obliga-
tion, for any profits it receives from securing or influencing the trans-
fer of its management contract with such investment company to an-
45 id. at 2.
46 See note 17 supra.
47 See note 20 supra.
45 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
45 See Kannel, supra note 13, at 181.
50 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a), 15
	 § 80a-15(a) (1970) ; Rule
15a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-1 (1971).
61
 Kannel, supra note 13, at 225; Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and
Separate Accounts, 51 B.U.L. Rev. 173, 355 (1971).
52 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
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other. This decision would appear to conflict with a prior decision of
the Ninth Circuit" which dismissed an SEC suit alleging substan-
tially the same cause of action, although the SEC suit was based in
part on Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of . 1940." That
decision notwithstanding, Rosenfeld appears to have discouraged
further transfers of management contracts. It also raises questions
concerning the numerous tranifers of mutual fund managements which
have occurred in recent years, a substantial number of which have
involved insurance companies as the acquiring parties." Although
Rosenfeld v. Black was a suit against the dispOsing parties, it has been
reported that, among the number of similar suits which have been
filed since the Second Circuit announced its decision, there is at least
one in which an insurance company was named as a defendant."
Important practical advantages arising from acquisition of a fund
are the opportunities to buy a profitable, successful company and to
acquire a skilled management team. However, these advantages must
be weighed against the facts that few such companies are available, and
that, if available, their price may be prohibitive. Despite these diffi-
culties, however, statistics show that insurance companies have acquired
a significant number of mutual fund management/underwriter orga-
nizations, primarily from 1968 through 1970." By the end of March,
1971, a total of eighty-six mutual funds had become part of insurance
company complexes in this manner, and the net assets of the funds in
this category aggregated about $7.8 •billion." The substantially larger
aggregate net asset value 'of these funds as compared to that of com-
pany-organized funds is due to the fact that many of the "acquired"
funds were well-established and successful operations. It remains to
be seen whether insurance company acquisitions of funds will con-
58
 SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 254
F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958). For a discussion of the SEC's
unsuccessful efforts to challenge "trafficking" in the control of fund management com-
panies, cf. The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, supra note 3, at 956-67.
54
 Section 36, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970). This
section authorizes injunctive suits directed at breaches of fiduciary duty toward a
registered investment company. The IS1 case involved Section 36 as it stood prior to its
amendment by Section 20 of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970. Act of
Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1428. It is conceivable that the ISI case
would be decided differently today under the expanded provisions of amended Section 36,
which now provide that breaches of fiduciary duty may be alleged and proved with respect
to "payments" received by an investment adviser from an investment company. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35 (1970). This might be construed as being applicable to profits received by the
adviser from the transfer of the advisory contract if such profits are deemed to belong to
the investment company.
Routier, supra note 28, at 26.
56 Id.
57 Wiesenberger Services, Inc., Investment Companies 1971 at 377.
58 Wiesenberger Services, Inc., Mutual Affairs, vol. 11, no. 5 at 1 (May, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Mutual Affairs].
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tinue in the seventies despite the potential liabilities inherent in this
route.
3. Association with an Existing Fund
For those companies finding that creation or acquisition of a
fund is too ambitious a program, there is a third alternative which
is more economical than either in terms of expense involved and degree
of regulation encountered. Simply stated, an insurer can always elect
to sell someone else's mutual fund shares. The insurer must set up a
broker-dealer operation, usually through a subsidiary of the insurance
company, and register this broker-dealer with the SEC. The regulatory
framework that he must cope with, however, will be limited principally
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the various state Blue Sky
laws, and the various rules of the NASD." The costs and problems of
registering shares under the 1933 Act will not concern him.
While this approach has obvious practical advantages, its limi-
tations must be noted. Should there be actionable or criminal mis-
statements or material omissions of fact in the fund's prospectus, the
insurance company broker-dealer and its salesmen may be held liable
for such misstatements or omissions under the federal securities
laws." Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of this method is the fact that
no profit can be realized from the management aspect of a mutual fund
operation. Rather, only the selling agents will realize profits from the
sale of an outside fund's shares, although the availability of this equity
product in an agent's offërings may help bolster sales of traditional
insurance products!".
Notwithstanding its limitations, the practice of selling shares of an
outside mutual fund is widespread in the insurance industry. As of
March 1, 1970, over 160 Iife insurance companies were members of
the National Association of Security Dealers, either directly or
through subsidiary broker-dealers." Of these, 130 insurers were sell-
ing shares of unrelated funds and only thirty were marketing shares
of their own fund." Whatever the method of entry chosen, insurers
now appear inextricably committed to involvement with mutual funds.
59 See pp. 1198-1201 supra.
00 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
01 The Institutional Investor Study found that of the many factors motivating in-
surers to enter the mutual fund field, the most important considerations were that
"mutual funds [provide] 1) a means of developing a financial package more salable than
traditional products in an inflationary environment, 2) a means of increasing agents' in-
come, and 3) a means of increasing sales of individual insurance policies." Institutional
Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt,2, at 529 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor
Study],
92 Id. at 523.
99 Id.
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By March, 1971, 219 mutual funds holding approximately $24 billion,
or forty-four percent of the total net assets of the mutual fund indus-
try, were in some way linked to insurance companies." At the same
time, more than 160 insurers were actually involved in selling their
own mutual fund shares or shares of an unrelated fund." Yet it
would seem that the actual volume of mutual fund shares sold by
insurance agents is still far below their expected potential," due to
the relative novelty of equity products as a part of the insurance
sales line.
Insurance companies are excited about this sales potential. There
is reason for their optimism. Full-time insurance agents outnumber
full-time mutual fund salesmen by more than six to one, a figure which
indicates that insurers have marketing forces available which can
easily be activated upon proper training and registration. In addition,
insurance policyholders, all prospective sales contacts, outnumber
mutual fund shareholders by 130 million to 5 million.67 The implica-
tions of these statistics in terms of the insurance industry's potential
for reaching a sizeable segment of the investing public are clear. They
further evidence the fact that the combination of insurance and mutual
funds is here to stay.
II. VARIABLE ANNUITIES
.	 A. Introduction
The second major equity -product currently marketed by life in-
surance companies is the variable annuity. An annuity, in simple
terms, is a contract under which the insurance company, in return for
the consideration paid by the purchaser, agrees, upon maturity of the
contract, to make periodic cash payments to the purchaser for the re-
mainder of his life. Under a traditional annuity, the amount of each
payment is actuarially calculated when the annuity is purchased,
a calculation based upon the annuitant's remaining life expectancy
after the date on which payments begin, and, once determined, the
amount remains fixed for the duration of the contract. The purchaser
of an annuity seeks to insure that, regardless of how long he may live,
he will have a guaranteed source of income; however, because annuity
payments are fixed, he is not protected against decreases in the pur-
chasing power of his income arising from inflation. The variable an-
64 Mutual Affairs, supra note 58, at 1. About $15 billion of this figure is held by 53
funds in which the insurance company is a single element in a large fund or corporate
complex. Id. at 4.
65 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 61, at 523.
66
 Id. at 536.
87 The Mutual Fund Industry, A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732, 874
(1969).
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nuity contract was developed to furnish protection against cost-of-
living increases. It functions in essentially the same manner as a
straight annuity, with one critical distinction: the purchase price of
the variable annuity is used to fund a separate account with equity
securities, and the periodic payments due the annuitant will vary to
reflect the investment performance of this account."
The contract usually has two separate phases. The first is a "pay-
in" period during which the contract holder makes installment pay-
ments which, after deductions for sales and administrative charges,
are applied to the purchase of accumulation units in the separate
account." Subsequently, at a date selected by the contract holder—
usually retirement—the current value of the units accumulated during
the "pay-in" phase is applied to the purchase of an annuity, which
may be fixed, variable or a combination of both." The "pay-out"
phase then begins and, to the extent the annuity payments elected are
variable, they will be adjusted in accordance with the investment per-
formance of the .separate account"- Thus the variable annuity has the
08 Because of the variety of plans possible, the distinction between fixed and variable
annuities is not always clear. See G. Johnson and D. Grubbs, Variable Annuities 41 (2d ed.
1970).
Until recently the term "separate account" was not statutorily defined under the
federal securities laws. Section 4 of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970
added § 2(a) (37) to the Investment Company Act which defines the term as follows:
(37) "Separate account" means an account established and maintained by
an insurance company pursuant to the laws of any State or territory of the
United States, or of Canada or any province thereof, under which income,
gains and losses, whether or not realized, from assets allocated to such account,
are, in accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against
such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the insurance
company.
15 U.S.C.	 80a-2(a)(37) (1970). For a detailed explanation of the separate account
concept see Frankel, supra note 51, at 247.
00 Since the value of these units fluctuates to reflect the investment performance of
the separate account, at any given time, its value may be determined in precisely the
same manner as the net asset value of a mutual fund share is calculated. See note 9 supra.
70 ft is possible to omit the "pay-in" or accumulation phase by purchasing a
variable annuity under which payments to the annuitant begin immediately. In the past,
traditional fixed-benefit annuities were sold principally in such single-payment form.
Today, however, variable annuities are sold mostly on an installment basis.
71 The value of each periodic payment under a variable annuity is determined by
the then current value of a number of annuity units. Annuity units are similar to ac-
cumulation units and are valued in the same manner, For example, if under a particular
contract monthly annuity payments are based on the value of 15 annuity units, the
monthly payment will be $60.00 if the value of an annuity unit is $4.00. If in the following
month the value of an annuity unit has increased to $4.10, the payment in that month
will be $61.50. This is a slight oversimplification, since it does not take into account
adjustments made for the assumed interest rate which is built into the contract. If in the
above example the assumed interest rate were set at the typical figure of 35/2%, monthly
payments would remain constant at $60.00 if the investment performance of the separate
account was exactly 3 1A% and would vary only if such performance exceeded or fell
below this assumed annual increment, The assumed interest rate is one of the factors
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capacity to furnish annuitants protection against cost-of-living in-
creases.
B. SEC Regulation of Variable Annuities
In the landmark case of SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co. of America, the United States Supreme Court held that variable
annuities were securities requiring registration under the Securities
Act of 1933 and that VALIC, as issuer, was an investment company
subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940.72 The Court re-
jected VALIC's argument that the 1933 Act exemption for annuity
contracts applied to variable annuities." Although the Court recog-
nized the obvious similarities between the traditional annuity and the
variable annuity, it noted a crucial distinction between the two:
"[A]bsent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable annuity
places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the com-
pany. The holder gets only a pro rata share of what the portfolio of
equity interest reflects—which may be a lot, a little, or nothing.""
Because of this absence of risk-taking on the insurer's part, the vari-
able annuity could not be equated with a straight annuity for pur-
poses of the exemption provided by the 1933 Act. 75 The Court further
found that VALIC was an investment company within the meaning of
the Investment Company Act, and that it did not qualify for the in-
surance company exemption under the Act since its principal business
activity was the writing of variable annuity contracts rather than
insurance contracts."
which, together with the remaining life expectancy of the annuitant and the value of
accumulation units purchased during the "pay-in" period, goes into the actuarial cal-
culations which in each case determine the number of annuity units on which periodic
payments will be based.
72
 359 U.S. 65 (1959), rev'g 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See Frankel, supra note
51, at 195-219 for a complete analysis of the VALIC case.
78
 359 U.S. at 72. Section 3(a)(8) of the 1933 Act exempts from its provisions "[a]ly
insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by
a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner,
or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the United
States or the District of Columbia." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1970).
74 359 U.S. at 71.
75 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. 	 77c(a) (8) (1970). In an attempt
to conform to the judicial guidelines laid down in VALIC, United Benefit Life Insurance
Co. created a variable annuity contract which would satisfy the requirements for exemp-
tion from the Securities Act expressed by the VALIC Court. In SEC v. United Benefit
Life Insurance Co. the hybrid annuity was held by the Supreme Court to be nonexempt
and subject to the 1933 Act, the Court relying on the insurance-investment distinction
enunciated in VALIC. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
75 359 U.S. at 71. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1970). The 1940 Act explicitly provides
that insurance companies are not investment companies for purposes of that Act.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[t& Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance." § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1970).
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There remained for a time the question of the status under the
Investment Company Act of an insurer who wrote variable annuities
but who, unlike VALIC, was primarily engaged in traditional in-
surance activities and therefore appeared to be within the standard
for exemption set by Section 3 (c) (3) of the Act." This issue was
resolved by the SEC in a 1963 decision, Prudential Insurance Com-
pany of America v. SEC, holding that, while the insurance company
was not itself an investment company, the pool of equity securities
funded by the annuity contract was an investment company subject
to registration as such under the Investment Company Act." The
Commission reasoned that when an insurance company "creates a
fund exclusively for investment, and sells equity interests in the for-
tunes of the fund, the exemption [of Section 3 (c) (3) of the Act] does
not carry over to the fund.179 The Commission concluded that Pruden-
tial's sale of variable annuity contracts would create a fund, "the In-
vestment Fund account," which would "invest, reinvest or trade in
securities," thereby subjecting these activities to the requirements of
the Investment Company Act. 8° Thus Prudential led to the practice
of registering insurance company separate accounts used to fund
variable annuities as investment companies, and to the dual regulation
of such accounts, and the contracts funded therein, by the SEC and
state insurance authorities who regard variable annuities as insurance
products.'
The end result of the VALIC and Prudential decisions was to
place variable annuities under the same basic regulatory scheme that
is applicable to mutual funds.' From such placing an "uncomfortable
77 See note 73 supra.
79
 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v, SEC, 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d
383 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
79
 41 S.E.C. at 340-41.
90
 Id. at 348.
Although one legacy of the Prudential decision is a tendency to regard the
variable annuity separate account as "just another mutual fund", there are
basically important structural and operational differences between the two that
should not be forgotten. A variable annuity contract is just that—a contract
between the annuitant and the insurer sponsoring the separate account. In con-
trast, the mutual fund shareholder is an equity owner of the fund which in turn
contracts with the investment manager. There is no contractual relationship
between the shareholder and the investment manager.
Finnegan and Garner, The Separate Account as an Investment Company: Structural
Problems of the "Ectoplasmic Theory", 3 Conn. L. Rev. 106, 116 (1970).
81
 State insurance regulation, like state securities regulation, varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Insurers have had a long time to accustom themselves to state regulation,
however, and difficulties with respect to the regulation of variable annuities occur
primarily at the federal level. See note 21 supra.
82
 The operation of a variable annuity business involves the same four basic statutes
that must be complied with in the mutual fund business. See notes 13-19 and accompanying
text supra. The restrictions on sales literature noted earlier with regard to mutual funds
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combination"" arose: numerous practical difficulties were encountered
in adapting the requirements of the Investment Company Act to the
insurance aspects of the variable annuity." As one scholar has said
of the problems arising from this regulatory scheme, "Nile applica-
tion of the 1940 Act to a business based on an insurance scheme also
raised conceptual difficulties. The operation and structure of an in-
surance account is not compatible with the model to which the Invest-
ment Company Act applies. Measures of investment performance and
reserves cannot fit into the molds of shares and corporate-like capital
structures!'"
The impact of VALIC and Prudential has been significantly
modified, however. A series of ad hoc exemptions from regulation by
the federal securities laws has been made available for certain types
of annuity contracts. This development began with a series of exemp-
tive rules issued by the SEC with regard to certain classes of equity-
funded group contracts," and recently culminated in the codification
also exist with respect to variable annuities, since the Statement of Policy applies to all
types of investment companies. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra. However,
in the latter case the problem is of greater magnitude, since it can be argued with some
justification that it is difficult for the consumer properly to evaluate different variable
annuity contracts having differing assumed interest rates because the SOP prohibits the
use of comparative projections showing the effects of such differing rates.
83
 Jones, The Variable Annuity and the 1940 Act—An Uncomfortable Combination,
3 Conn. L. Rev. 144 (1970).
84
 An illustrative example is the problem of redeemability during the "pay-out"
period of a variable annuity contract. Because of the SEC's classification of variable
annuities as periodic payment plans, the issuer would be required to redeem such annuities
by virtue of § 27(c) (1) of the Act and § 22(e) would prohibit the issuer from suspending
this right of redemption. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22(e), 27(c)(1) (1970). However, the actuarial
calculations used in determining annuity payments assume that all annuitants will remain
in the group, so that permitting redemption during the pay-out period would undermine
the actuarial basis of the contracts. As a result, each insurance company registering a
variable annuity separate account had to request exemption from this requirement.
Another example is the still unresolved issue of whether total charges (sales and
administrative) under a variable annuity contract can exceed the limitations on sales
charges alone imposed under § 27 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1970). If sales and ad-
ministrative charges are stated separately to avoid this problem, it is still possible the
staff of the SEC will attempt to impose a total limit by questioning the reasonableness of
the administrative portion of the charges, thus involving itself in the administrative affairs
of the life insurance company. For addtional examples, see Jones, supra note 83, at 163-75.
85
 Frankel, supra note 51, at 246.
86
 Exemptions which routinely had been granted upon individual application were
codified in Investment Company Act Rules 14a-2, 15a-3, 16a-1, 22e-1, 27a-1, 27a-2, 27a-3,
27c-1, and 32a-2, 17 C.F.R. 11 270.14a-2, 15a-3, 16a-1, 22e-1, 27a-1, 27a-2, 27a-3,
27c-1, 32a-2 (1971). See Investment Company Act Release No. 5738 (July 10,
1969) and 6559 (June 10, 1971). An additional group of exemptive rules for variable
annuity separate accounts registered under the Act was proposed in 1970 but was recently
withdrawn. See Investment Company Act Release Nos. 6039 (Apr. 30, 1970) and 6949
(Jan. 19, 1972). The existence of these rules and proposals tends to confirm the proposi-
tion that the Investment Company Act is not well-suited to variable annuity regulation.
A discussion of the history of these rules appears in Middlebrook and Gingold, Mass
Merchandising of Equity Products by Insurance Companies, 3 Conn. L. Rev. 44 (1970).
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of various exemptions in the Investment Company Amendments Act
of 1970."
A group contract allows the insurer to cover a number of indi-
viduals, who are unrelated to each other, by utilization of a single
source of payment, such as an employer, a trust, or an association.
Traditionally, the term "group annuity" identified an agreement by
the insurer to receive payments from the group or their employer and
to credit these payments to a fund that would be sufficient "to provide
a fixed amount of dollars on a periodic basis to a group of identifiable
employees."" The most common form of group contract is the pension
plan. The Commission had for some years offered exemptions from
the securities laws to certain defined tax qualified group contracts
which resembled already exempt stock bonus, pension and profit-
sharing plans." The critical determinant in justifying these exemp-
tions, one authority writes, "has been the realization that employers
charged with providing retirement benefits for employees have a de-
gree of sophistication and investment experience which does not re-
quire the same range of protection under the federal securities acts as
has been extended to individuals or others purchasing equity-funded
insurance products."'"
Many of these exemptions were codified in the Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970." In this Act, Congress passed legis-
87
 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1414 (1970), amending Investment Company Act of
1940, § 3(c)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (13) (1970), renumbered to § 3(c)(11), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-3(c) (11). See Routier, Federal Securities Regulation 1971, at 33, for a concise sum-
mary of the 1970 Amendments. Paper Presented Before the American Life Convention
(Oct. 26, 1971), to be reprinted in the 1971 Proceedings of the American Life Convention,
Legal Section [hereinafter cited as Routier; citations are to manuscript pages].
88
 Middlebrook and Gingold, supra note 86, at 51-52.
89 See note 86 supra.
90 Middlebrook and Gingold, supra note 86, at 50.
01
 The following diversity of regulatory patterns exists today with respect to variable
annuity contracts:
(a) pursuant to § 3 (e) (11) of the Investment Company Act an insurance com-
pany separate account is excluded from the definition of an investment
company if its assets are derived solely from contributions under pension
or profit-sharing plans qualified under El 401 or 404(a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code (or from advances made by the insurance company in con-
nection with the operation of such account). 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c) (11) (1970).
This category encompasses both corporate plans and the so-called "Keogh"
or "art. 10" self-employed retirement plans. Separate accounts funding
only such plans are completely outside the regulatory scope of the Invest-
ment Company Act. However, if the separate account is used as the funding
medium for any other type of variable annuity contract, this exclusion is
inapplicable;
(b) pursuant to § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act, as amended, and §§ 3(a)(12)
and 12(g)(2)(H) of the Securities Exchange Act, as amended, corporate
pension or profit-sharing plans qualified under §§ 401 or 404(a) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code are defined as "exempt securities" for the purposes
of such Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1970) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (12), 1(g) (2)
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lation designed to place insurance companies competing for the group
pension and profit-sharing plan business on an equal plane with banks,
whose administration of such plans is not subject to federal securities
laws .° The obvious rationale for this result is that if banks have been
granted statutory exemptions for their administration of pension plans,
it is not unreasonable to give insurance companies, which provide
similar services and would deal with the same sophisticated and ex-
perienced employers, a similar exemption.
C. The Outlook for the Future
At the end of 1970, reserves held in individual variable annuity
contracts amounted to more than $150 million, while reserves on
group variable annuity plans totalled $1.7 billion, indicating the pre-
dominant popularity of the latter plans .° The predominance of group
variable annuities can be expected to continue in the future, for sev-
eral reasons. In the first place, insurers realize substantial savings
from handling annuity coverage on a group basis rather than on an
individual basis. Similarly, mass merchandising of annuities allows
insurance sales personnel to earn commissions competitive with those
available from the sale of traditional insurance products, in contrast
to individual sales of annuities on which commission rates are re-
stricted."
Another major factor contributing to the predominance of group
annuity plans over individual annuities is the federal securities law
regulatory pattern. The exemption of group annuities from the sweep
of the federal laws has removed the dual burden of federal and state
regulation and has undoubtedly made sales of group plans more
palatable than individual sales to insurance companies. Moreover,
(H) (1970). Variable annuity contracts of this type are therefore not sub-
ject to any of the registration or reporting requirements of these Acts, al-
though, as is true of any "exempt security" they remain subject to the
general antifraud provisions thereof. These exemptions do not apply to the
Keogh or H.R. 10 retirement plans, whether sold on an individual or group
basis, producing the somewhat anomalous result that variable annuities under
such plans are treated as registered securities although the separate account
in which they are funded is not subject to registration as an investment
company;
(c) all remaining types of variable annuity contracts remain subject to all the
federal securities statutes. This includes all individual and group contracts
not having tax-qualified or tax-deferred features, as well as tax-sheltered
annuities qualified under § 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. Of these,
however, only the group § 403(h) plans are of much significance in terms
of sales volume.
92 See SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 61, ch. 8, for a detailed discus-
sion of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970.
93 Institute of Life Insurance, Tally of Life Insurance Statistics 2 (Jan. 1972).
94 See Middlebrook and Gingold, supra note 86; SEC Institutional Investor Study,
supra note 61, at 536-38.
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group contracts have proven popular vehicles for tax qualified retire-
ment and pension plans, which offer substantial tax benefits to an-
nuitants. In fact, much of the group variable annuity market has been
concentrated in tax-qualified plans because of their attractiveness as
retirement planning vehicles, and it is reasonable to assume that this
concentration will continue."
Historically, individual annuity sales have been of minor impor-
tance in comparison to overall insurance sales, and the introduction
of the variable annuity has done little to alter this pattern. Many of
the very factors contributing to the popularity of group variable
annuities indicate the reasons why individual annuities have not en-
joyed success. In particular, the burden of SEC regulation, with its
limitations on advertising and commission rates, has inhibited sales
of individual variable annuities." In the early years of its develop-
ment, the variable annuity was not considered an important equity
product by the majority of the insurance industry. A 1959 poll re-
vealed that four out of five insurance companies were opposed to the
sale of individual annuities, and opposition to group contracts was
nearly as strong 97 Now this opposition has largely subsided, and the
future of the variable annuity, at least in the area of group tax-
sheltered plans, should prove to be of continuing significance to insurers
in their attempt to capture more of America's savings dollar.
III. VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE
A. Introduction
While mutual funds and variable annuities have been valuable
additions to life insurance product lines, enabling agents to offer
policyholders a more complete and balanced financial planning pro-
gram, they have never been viewed by the insurance industry as a
substitute or replacement for life insurance itself. Rather, mutual funds
and variable annuities have been recognized as primarily investment-
oriented vehicles, and hence as unsuitable for fulfilling the basic pur-
pose of life insurance—the provision of protection to the insured's
beneficiaries in the form of policy benefits payable on the death of the
insured. A life insurance policy, under which the insuring company
must pay the full face amount upon death even though the insured
may have made only one relatively small premium payment," is still
the only viable means of providing such protection. However, the fact
DD Id, at 541.
Do Id. at 536.
97 Journal of Commerce 1 (June 17, 109).
98 In comparison, an investor in mutual fund shares or variable annuities would
only realize a return of his equity upon death.	 •
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that policy benefits are stated in fixed-dollar amounts has come to be
regarded by many persons as an unsatisfactory characteristic of an
otherwise desirable product. The disadvantages of fixed benefits are
particularly marked where the insured is long-lived, since the erosion
in purchasing power of any given fixed-dollar amount over a number
of decades is likely to be dramatic. In their quest to mitigate this effect,
insurance companies are actively engaged in the development of a new
product called variable life insurance.
It must be noted at this point that the term "variable life insur-
ance" currently has no generally accepted meaning. In some cases the
term may be used to describe policies that are little more than varia-
tions of the old scheme of decreasing term insurance plus equity in-
vestments." Essentially, these are "buy term and invest the difference"
programs sold in a single wrapper; they will not be discussed further
in this article. In other cases, the variability of policy benefits is linked
to some external index, for instance a cost-of-living or consumer price
index.1°° A rise in the index to a certain level will trigger an incre-
mental increase in policy benefits. Hence, when this type of policy is
in effect, benefit increases do not depend upon favorable investment
experience on the part of the issuing life insurance company. Even
should the value of the company's investments in fact decline during
a given period, the company is contractually obligated to increase
benefits by the amount stated under the policy if, during the same pe-
riod, the index rises to a certain level. This feature cuts both ways,
however, since favorable investment experience by the company does
not act to increase policy benefits, which rise only as the index rises.
Policies of this nature are often referred to as "index" policies, and
these also will not be included in the balance of this discussion.
The remaining types of variable life insurance, unlike the index
policies just described, are truly equity-based in that policy benefits
vary in accordance with the investment performance of an equity
9 See Beck, Variable Life Insurance: A Perspective on Current Issues and Develop-
ments, in Proceedings of the National Conference on Variable Life Insurance 2, 3 (March
1971). Insurance of this type is currently being marketed in Great Britain. Id.
100 See SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 61, at 539. A relatively negligible
number of these policies have been sold in the United States to date. Id. Although it had
been assumed that index policies were not within the aegis of federal securities legislation,
a recent insurance company request for an SEC staff opinion recognizing this exemptiton
has put in doubt the validity of this assumption. The variable policy in question was tied
to the New 'York Stock Exchange index and provided that the variable portion of the
contract would not fall below the original cash surrender value. While the SEC response
indicated that there was a lack of information on which a decision could be announced,
it also indicated that, in general, if policy benefits vary in relation to a pool of equity
securities, a security exists requiring registration under the 1933 Act and registration of
the issuer under the 1940 Act. Routier, supra note 87, at 17.
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account 'maintained to fund such policies.'" American insurers have
become principally interested in this category of policy1 02 For the
purpose of further discussion, then, the term "variable life insurance"
will be applied only to policies whose death benefits vary to reflect the
investment experience of the separate account through which they are
funded.'
While on the surface this definition may appear to be somewhat
simplistic, it nevertheless includes the key elements which distinguish
the variable life insurance policies now being developed in this country
both from their fixed-benefit counterparts and from other so-called
variable policies:
(1) Variable benefits.—This is the obvious distinction be-
tween fixed-benefit policies and 'variable policies of any
kind.
(2) Fluctuation in accordance with investment performance.
—Unlike index policies, increases in policy benefits are
contingent upon investment performance rather than
upon a change in the cost of living or some other ex-
ternal yardstick.
(3) Use of a separate account.—Fixed-benefit policies are
not funded in separate accounts: Index policies may or
may not be.'" Under the definition of variable life in-
surance used here, net •premium payments are applied
entirely to a single separate 'account.
Although the definition does not so specify, it is also generally assumed
that the assets of a separate account. maintained to fund variable life
insurance policies will be invested primarily in equities rather than
in the more conservative debt investments, such as high-grade bonds
and mortgages; state laws require that most assets held with respect
to fixed benefit policies be invested.
101 See generally Beck, note 99 supra. See also Variable Life Insurance—A Product
of the Seventies, in 1970 Proceedings of the ABA Section of Insurance, Negligence and
Compensation Law at 266, for an interesting panel discussion on variable life insurance
[hereinafter cited as Variable Life Insurance, 1970 ABA Proceedings]. Variable life in-
surance policies of this type are currently being marketed in Canada and Holland. Id. at
268.
102
 There is some limited interest in index or formula type variable policies. See
note 100 supra. See also, Bragg, Life Insurance with Guaranteed Purchasing Power, in
Proceedings of the National Conference on Variable Life ,Insurance 47 (March 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bragg]; Institutional Investor Study, supra note 61, at 538-40.
103
 This separate account would consist of a segregated pool of investment assets
and would have essentially the same characteristics as a separate account maintained to
fund variable annuity contracts. See note 68 supra.
101
 In variable policies along the British model, noted above, only part of the pre-
mium payment is allocated to an equity investment pool; the remainder is applied to the
purchase of decreasing term insurance.
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There does not appear to be any serious doubt that variable life
insurance policies of this nature can be developed successfully, al-
though, as with any new product, initial growing pains are bound to
be felt, and concrete problems must be discovered and worked out.
Actuaries appear to agree that existing actuarial techniques used in
the fixed-benefit policy area to determine premiums, reserves and other
associated calculations can be modified and employed to design com-
parable policies providing variable benefits linked to the Performance
of an equity-based separate account. 1" Further, through specific
changes in statutes or regulations, at least twelve states have autho-
rized the sale of variable life insurance, and such sale also appears
to be permissible under the existing laws of a dozen or so additional
states.'" Amendment of existing statutes or regulations would be re-
quired to permit the sale of variable life insurance in the remaining
states, but past experience suggests that such changes would not be
overly difficult to effect. 107
Experience in other countries, as well as the marked overall
increase in public interest in equity investments in the United States,
appear to indicate that variable life insurance would have a definite
market appeal.'" However, despite these favorable auspices, the first
variable life insurance policy has yet to be sold in the United States.
The reason: the unresolved key question of whether, or to what extent,
the federal securities laws will be applied to this new product.
B. Potential Federal Regulatory Problems
Aware of the problems arising from regulation of variable annui-
ties, the insurance industry is not particularly anxious to see any form
of federal securities regulation applied to variable life insurance. Dual
federal and state regulation of the product will inevitably result in
overlapping and conflicting requirements, added complexities, and
extra expense. This was, and to some extent continues to be, the case
with variable annuities, and there is no reason to assume that it would
105 See Proceedings of the National Conference on Variable Life Irisurance (March,
1971) containing Blakeslee 'A Unit Variable Life Insurance Design, at 61; Sternhell, The
New York Life Benefit Design and its Practical Implementation, at 70, and Walker, A
Fixed Premium Variable Benefit Life Insurance Design, at 83. See also,, Variable Life
Insurance, 1970 ABA Proceedings, supra note 101.
1" Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1972, at 26, col. 2. See Institutional Investor
Study, supra note 61, at 540; and Variable Life Insurance, 1970 ABA Proceedings, supra
note 101, at 286-88.
107 This is evidenced by the fact that the laws of all 50 states have been amended
to permit use of insurance company separate accounts without restrictions upon the
nature of investment assets permitted in such accounts. Frankel, supra note 51, at 255
n.125.
108 See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1972, at 26; Middlebrook and Gingold,
supra note 86, at 100.
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•be any different with respect to variable life insurance. 109 Whether or
.not regulation of variable life insurance under the federal securities
laws would be so onerous as to stunt or prevent its development as a
marketable product is perhaps debatable, but the prevailing sentiment
among interested companies appears to be that if the SEC is "in"
with respect to variable life insurance, then they would prefer to be
"out."'
It is difficult, however, to find statements which articulate with
any degree of specificity the reasons why the industry wishes to avoid
SEC regulation. There are a number, of factors which could account
for this silence. Variable life insurance has not yet been sold in the
United States, and in its current embryonic stage the relatively little
literature available on the subject primarily concerns matters such as
product design, marketability and probable agent response 1' 1 Since
regulation by the SEC though a possibility is by no means a certainty,
there exists a certain amount of inertia to be overcome before the
industry will feel a pressing need for detailed research into the entire
range of difficulties which might arise from the application of the
securities laws to variable life insurance.'"
A few general statements can safely be made concerning regula-
tion of variable life insurance by the SEC, should the Commission
conclude that such a product is a security. Registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 would be necessary; 1'3
 however, since this Act
is principally a disclosure statute, the registration statement itself
would constitute the major requirement of compliance. Points of dif-
ference would unquestionably arise regarding the appropriate content
of the registration statement and prospectus, but it is reasonable to
expect that after a sufficient number of filings had been made and
declared effective, the pattern of required disclosure would become
relatively standardized.
The 1933 Act, then, would presumably create only peripheral
.problems. The requirements of the 1934 Act that sales personnel be
qualified and sales practices regulated would impose far greater bur-
dens. Not all insurers would be affected, however. Those companies
• 103
 See notes 21 and 81 and accompanying text supra, noting the problems of federal-
state regulatory conflicts in the mutual fund and variable annuity areas. Compare Frankel,
supra note 51, at 385, calling for application of federal securities laws to some variable life
insurance plans, with Middlebrook and Gingold, supra note 86, at 100-04, arguing that
variable insurance should be held exempt from existing federal legislation.
110
 Wallach, Variable Life Insurance: An Overview, 121, 123, in Proceedings of the
National Conference on Variable Life Insurance (March, 1971).
111
 See articles cited in note 105 supra.
112
 See generally Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and Separate Ac-
counts, 51 B.U. L. Rev. 177, 201 (1971).
113
 "[V]ariable life in all forms should be exempt from 1933 Act regulation by virtue
of 1 3(a) (8)" [see note 73 supra]. Middlebrook and Gingold, supra note 86, at 100-01.
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already selling mutual funds and/or variable annuities have already
qualified their sales personnel as registered representatives and estab-
liShed supervision procedures; and practically all have membership in
the NASD, either directly or through a broker-dealer subsidiary.
Hence the effort and expense which qualification under. the 1934 Act
entails would weigh most heavily upon a company desiring to enter
the variable life field but lacking previous involvement with equity
products. A considerable number of companies may find themselves in
such a position; _many companies have chosen to avoid SEC regula-
tion by declining to enter the mutual fund or variable annuity busi-
ness. Funds and annuities, however, do not compete directly with
permanent fixed-benefit life insurance, whereas variable life insurance
obviously would. It has even been suggested that, should variable life
insurance be successfully marketed, a company offering only fixed-
benefit policies might find that it has effectively taken itself out of the
life insurance' business."' While this proposition may be an overstate-
ment, it represents a real possibility, and many insurers with product
lines not previously subject to SEC regulation might consider . it nec-
essary to enter the variable life business foi competitive reasons.
Hence the potential scope of SEC regulation of the insurance business
appears broad indeed. Legal issues aside, a legitimate question arises
regarding the practicality of sustaining SEC regulation over so broad
an area.
No one has yet suggested that it would be impossible to sell vari-
able life insurance subject to the provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 is another matter. Considerable
doubt has been expressed as to whether variable life insurance could
survive 'regulation as an investment company security.' The major
'difficulty arising from such regulation- would appear to be the Act's
relatively low limit on sales loads, a limit that would require that
agents selling variable policies be content with far lower commissions
than they receive for selling fixed-benefit policies. It is strongly sus-
pected that successful marketing of variable life insurance may be
contingent • upon the industry's ability to compensate agents on an
identical basis for sales of both fixed-benefit and variable benefit poli-
Cies,116 . thereby eliminating a possible bias on the part of the agents
extraneous to the actual needs and desire of a prospective policyholder.
Indeed, it would seem difficult to overemphasize the inherent conflict
114 Gustin, Federal Regulatory Aspicts of Variable Life Insurance, in Proceedings
of the National Conference on Variable Life Insurance 18, 19 (March, 1971).
115 Beck, supra note 99, at 4. 	
.	 .
116 Wallach, Variable Life Insurance: An Overview, in Proceedings . of 'the National
'COnference on Variable Life Insurance 123 (Mar. 1971) ; Wall Street Journal, April 10,
1972, at 26, col. 2.
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of interests an agent would face if he had to choose between selling
an ordinary fixed-benefit policy, which would yield a commission usu-
ally exceeding fifty percent of the first-year premium, and a variable
benefit policy, which, if sold as an investment company security,
would probably carry a maximum commission of nine percent.'"
There are, to be sure, other problems that regulation under the
Investment Company Act would pose with respect to variable life in-
surance. Those provisions of the Act regulating such matters as joint
transactions 118 have caused difficulty in the mutual fund and variable
annuity areas and presumably would do so in this instance. 11 ' Another
significant problem could arise if the SEC found that variable life
policies were periodic payment plans subject to the provisions of Sec-
tion 27 of the 1940 Act. 12° Section 27 requires that, under certain
circumstances, an investment company make full or partial refunds
of payments made by customers under a periodic payment plan. 121 As
applied to variable life insurance, however, full refunding would be
repugnant to the industry, since the return of anything beyond un-
earned premiums—or, where applicable, nonforfeiture values—would
erode and conceivably could even destroy the actuarial basis upon
which premium payments are calculated. This particular problem
illustrates the type of difficulty which can arise from the application
of a 1940 statute, designed primarily for the regulation of mutual
funds, to an essentially insurance-type product not yet conceived of
when the statute was drafted.
Admittedly, regulation by the SEC did not prove fatal to the vari-
able annuity, although it may well have impeded its growth as a mar-
ketable product since, as noted above, it has flourished principally in
areas where exemption has been available.'" It is possible, then, that
the marketing of variable life insurance may prove viable, even should
SEC regulation be imposed. This issue, however, may become academic
if the industry is successful in its efforts to convince the SEC that vari-
able life insurance merits exemption from federal securities regulation.
C. The Industry's Case for Exemption
Despite its firm belief that variable life insurance should not be
subject to federal securities legislation, the industry appears deter-
mined to avoid a repetition of the protracted and litigious disputes
117 Investment Company Act of 1940 27(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (1970). See
also Rules 27a-1, -2, 17 C.F.R. § 270.27a-1, -2 (1971).
110
 Id. 1 17(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1970).
no See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
120 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1970).
121
 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(c) (1970).
122 See pp. 1210-13 supra.
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with the SEC which attended its entry into the variable annuity busi-
ness. To this end the two dominant trade associations, the American
Life Convention and the Life Insurance Association of America, ap-
proached the Commission and its staff some time ago to determine
whether any agreement could be reached concerning the status of vari-
able life insurance under the federal securities laws.123 It was hoped
that the Commission could be persuaded to "decide not to assert juris-
diction over variable life insurance policies which are so designed that
their basic and predominant purpose and function is to provide pro-
tection against death." 124 This was the policy that the industry urged
in its formal Memorandum of October, 1970, which set forth certain
basic characteristics of variable life insurance contracts. The associa=
tions believed that these characteristics would insure that the insur-
ance function and purpose of the contracts would predominate, and
argued that contracts having such characteristics should be found to be
outside the scope of the federal securities laws." 5
The SEC staff responded with a request for additional detailed
information, which the associations furnished.128 A number of months
of relative inactivity ensued; then in July, 1971, the SEC staff in-
formed the associations that a formal proceeding would be required
to settle the issues involved?" The industry and the Commission
agreed upon a rule-making proceeding, 128 and on November 29, 1971,
industry representatives filed a formal Petition for such a proceed-
ing.129
The Petition requests that the Commission issue exemptive rules
which would, in effect, remove a specified class of variable life insur-
ance contracts from SEC jurisdiction. 180 The class of contracts in ques-
123 Harman, 1970 Report on Federal Legislation and Regulation 175, 206, in 1970
Proceedings of the Legal Section, American Life Convention.
124 Gustin, supra note 114, at 21, quoting American Life Convention--Life Insurance
Association of America Task Force on Variable Life Insurance, Memorandum to the SEC
(Oct. 28, 1970).
125 Id. at 21-24.
126 Id. at 24-28.
127 Routier, Federal Securities Regulation 1971, Paper Presented Before the Legal
Section, American Life Convention 72 (Oct. 26, 1971). To be reprinted in 1971 Proceed-
ings of the American Life Convention [citations are to manuscript pages].
128 Id. at 75-76.
121° Petition for Insurance and Amendment of Rules and Rule Making Proceeding
Therefor, filed by American Life Convention and Life Insurance Association of America
(Nov. 29, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
The Petition seeks exemption from the securities laws based on the following
provisions of each Act. Sections 6(c) and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-6(c), 38(a) (1970); § 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s(a) (1970); Sections 3(a)(12) and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(12), w(a) (1970); and §§ 202(a)(I1) and 211(a) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(11), -11(a) (1970). Petition, supra note 129,
at 2-6.
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tiOn would have, in essence, the four basic characteristics outlined in
the associations' 1970 Memorandum. Briefly summarized, these are:
(1) the contract must provide lifetime insurance coverage,
hence ,endowment-type contracts are excluded; 181
(2) the contract at issue must bear a stated minimum death
benefit and must guarantee payment of at least this
minimum amount upon death, irrespective of the in-
vestment performance of the separate account;'
(3) the minimum death benefit payable in any year must
equal or exceed a minimum multiple of the gross pre-
mium payable in such year, a characteristic which, given
sufficiently high multiples for each issuance bracket,
limits the price of premiums which may be charged and
thus is designed to prevent the introduction of increased
investment elements through the charging of higher-
than-necessary premiums; 18" and
(4) the contract must be fully subject to state insurance
laws, including •
 all required approvals by state commis-
sioners, so that state supervision of insurance compa-
nies, guaranteeing fiscal responsibility and fair sales
methods, will be assured."'
The industry's argument, essentially, is that any variable life
policy incorporating these basic features is predominantly a contract
of insurance and therefore is not an appropriate subject of regulation
under the federal securities laws."' The four characteristics have been
designed purposely to maximize the insurance element. The first two,
by providing for coverage for the duration of the insured's life and
guaranteeing payment of a minimum stated face amount of death
benefit, are traditional insurance features. These would clearly seem
to meet the standard set by the Supreme Court in the V ALIC case,
where the majority held that "the concept of 'insurance' involves some
investment risk-taking on the part of the company" and that "in com-
mon understanding 'insurance' involves a guarantee that at least some
fraction of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts." 13° If upon
payment by the insured of 'a premium of some several hundred dollars
on a variable life policy, the insurer becomes obligated to pay a mini-
mum benefit of perhaps $10,000 should the insured die shortly there=
131
 Id. at 14.
132
 Id. at 14-15.
133 Id. at 15-17.
184 id. at 17.
135
 "For purposes of determining the applicability of federal securities regulation the
key inquiry has to be in terms of which element [investment or insurance] is predominant
and central to the main purpose and function of the policy for the policy holder." Gustin,
supra note 114, at 21.
188
 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
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after, then the insuring company has indeed incurred a substantial
risk. Because of the whole-life feature, this risk continues until the
insured dies, although, as in ordinary fixed-benefit insurance, the pos-
sible loss to the company decreases as the number of years for which
premiums have been paid increases.
The third characteristic, providing for standardized ratios be-
tween yearly premiums payable and minimum death benefits due, is
designed to prevent the shifting of risk to the policyholder by means
of inflated premiums. A ceiling is placed on the level of premiums
which may be charged for any given minimum face amount of cover-
age under a variable life policy by requiring that such, minimum face
amount equal or exceed a stated multiple of the gross annual premium.
Under the table of stated multiples proposed in the Petition, there
would be a reasonable correlation between the premium charged on
a fixed-benefit policy and the premium charged on a variable policy with
a minimum guaranteed death benefit equal to such fixed benefit. 137 To
the extent that premiums for the same face amount of protection are
roughly equivalent under both types of policies, the amount of risk-
taking by the company is about the same in both cases, and the in-
dustry's argument for exemption is correspondingly buttressed.
The final characteristic, regulation of the ,contract under state
insurance laws, is intended to bring into play the exclusion of insur-
ance from federal regulation provided for in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act."' Should variable life insurance be found to be a security, the
exclusion would, of course, be inapplicable—witness the subjection of
the variable annuity to federal regulation.'"
The Petition does not address itself to the status of ,contracts
lacking these characteristics, nor does it concede the applicability of
federal securities laws to contracts with such characteristics."° Rather,
the stated purpose of the Petition is to eliminate, so far as the class
of contracts defined therein is concerned, "any question as to com-
pliance with such laws."'
In response to the Petition, the SEC on February 15, 1972, issued
notice of, and an order for, a public rule-making proceeding to be held
with respect to the exemptive rules requested by the insurance asso-
ciations."' The evidence-gathering portion of the proceeding began in
187 Petition, supra note 129, at 15.
118 15 U.S.C. * 1011 (1970). See note 76 supra.
139 See p. 1208 supra.
140 Petition, supra note 129, at 7.
141 Id. Note that the SEC does not have to decide the ultimate jurisdictional issues
in order to grant the exemptions requested; it may do so as a matter of administrative
discretion. The SEC reserved the option to use this course of action. Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5234 (Feb. 15, 1972).
192 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec.
	
Rep. 778,523, Securities Act Release No. 5234,
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April, 1972, and, the Commission' has started to receive testimony and
data concerning the proposed nature, operation and sale of variable
life insurance."'
The insurance industry's chances for success hinge upon its ability
to convince the Commission that the investment element in variable
life insurance is substantially outweighed by the insurance element.
It is not possible to deny that some investment element would exist
in variable life insurance as characterized by the Petition. This fact
does not vitiate the industry's argument, however, since the SEC has
recognized that even permanent fixed-benefit life insurance has a cer-
tain built-in savings or investment component which is a necessary
outgrowth of the level-premium concept."" As one leading commentator
has observed:
In the last analysis, there is no escaping the fact that
there is a continuous spectrum from a one-year term life in-
surance policy, which is pure insurance, through the various
forms of straight life and endowment policies, to the annui-
ties, both fixed and (in varying degrees) variable, to mutual
fund shares and ultimately common stock, which represent
pure investment.'"
The industry's goal, then, is to demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the SEC that variable life insurance is so sufficiently far removed from
the pure investment end of the spectrum that, as in the case of fixed-
benefit policies, the protection of the federal securities laws is neither
required nor appropriate. In light of the substantial insurance guar-
antees available to the holder of a variable life policy, and the concomi-
tant shifting of a large measure of investment risk to the issuing com-
pany, the industry's prospects for a favorable decision are much better
Exchange Act Release No. 9494, Investment Company Act Release No. 6999, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 310 (Feb. 15, 1972).
"3 See the SEC's testimony in Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 1206 (1967).
144 Industry witness will be presented in support of the Petition. The Commis-
sion's order also provides that other interested parties may request to appear at the
proceeding and it is almost certain that a number will do so. At present, participation in
the proceedings appears safely predictable with respect to two other organizations: the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which is expected to support the stance
of the insurance associations, and the Investment Company Institute, the trade associa-
tion of the mutual fund industry, which is expected to oppose it. Neither of these posi-
tions is surprising. An association of state insurance regulators naturally would endorse
the principle that variable life insurance is their business and not that of the SEC. On
the other hand, opposition by the ICI merely would reflect the fact that their members
do not view further encroachment by insurers into the equity-based products field with
any degree of comfort, and would not be happy to see this new product, via the rules
requested, escape the same regulatory requirements to which they are subject.
10 4 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 2534 (Supp. 1969).
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than they were in the case of the variable annuity,' where such ele-
ments were found not to be present to any significant degree.
Variable life insurance, if ever marketed in this country, may
well prove to be a product of major significance. This seems to be the
consensus of observers both in and out of the insurance industry, and
is apparently the view of the SEC as well From the industry's point
of view, the threshold question of whether variable life insurance
'feasibly can be marketed is now largely in the hands of the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Mutual funds have proven to be the most popular choice of in-
surance companies expanding their activities into the equity products
field. A number of reasons may be advanced to explain this phenome-
non. In the first place, mutual funds have been in existence for a
longer period of time than have the variable annuities and the still
undeveloped variable life insurance. As a result, they are better known
to and more widely accepted by the investing public. In addition, the
patterns of state and federal regulation are much better established
for mutual funds than for variable annuities .and, needless to say,
variable life insurance. The latter two products present many' regu-
latory problems that are still unresolved, and that may remain so for
some time. Further contributing to the popularity of mutual ,
 funds is
the fact that the formation of a mutual fund operation can serve as a
convenient basis for a company's later expansion into sales of annuities.
However,. the current prevalence of mutual funds as insurance
company equity vehicles should not be allowed to disguise recent . de-
velopments in federal regulation of group variable annuities. The In-
vestment Amendments Act of 1970 should serve to allow insurers full
access to the group variable annuity plan market, formerly dominated
by banks. Finally, not to be overlooked is the yet unexplored potential
market for variable life insurance, which one day may replace fixed-
benefit life insurance as the standard protection device utilized by the
American public.
146
 SEC Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 541 (1971).
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